LABOUR AND THE CONSTITUTION. 459 
standards in different provinces, and the advantages to be gained from 
sloser contact with local conditions do not outweigh the grave disad- 
vantages which the: loss of central machinery would bring. Burma, 
as we have already recognised, presents peculiar problems and, while 
we are satisfied that it has benefited greatly in respect of labour matters 
by its inclusion in the Indian Empire, we consider that there is not the 
same need for the maintenance of uniformity with India as there is in 
the case of the Indian provinces. 
Opinion on the Question. 
These considerations appear to be fully appreciated already, 
for the witnesses who appeared before us were overwhelmingly in favour 
of central legislation. We met none among Government officials, 
representatives of employers or representatives of labour who favoured 
the withdrawal of the power to legislate in respect of labour matters 
from the Central Legislature. While it was not suggested that pro- 
vincial legislatures should be deprived of any power which they now 
possess, the view is widely held that legislation on an all-India scale is 
ordinarily preferable. We observe that the Reports of the All-Parties 
Conference of 1928, of the Indian Statutory Commission and of 
the Federal Structure sub-Committee of the Indian Round Table 
Conference all contemplate central labour legislation. We also are 
convinced that the objections to the complete provincialisation of labour 
legislation are so great that every effort should be directed towards 
avoiding this course. 
Central Authority over Administration. 
There are, however, certain difficulties connected with central, 
legislation which must be faced. As a rule those who have given 
svidence before us have been impressed by the advantages which have 
resulted from the present arrangement, by which the more important 
labour laws are passed by the Central Legislature and administered by 
the provincial Governments. But there are important factors in the 
present position which are likely to be profoundly modified under any 
future constitution. In the first place, the Central Government have at 
present the power of superintendence, direction and control. If in 
practice this has involved no close supervision over administration, 
it has been of assistance in preventing the value of legislation being 
impaired by lax administration. Another factor which has probably 
been more valuable in securing smooth working has been the tradi- 
bon of the past. The system of administration was devised in a period 
when the authority of the Central Government was complete, and 
the actual administration has remained largely in the hands of men who 
had been responsible for it prior to the Reforms. The inherent diffi- 
culties of the position are also minimised by the fact that the side of 
the provincial Government which is responsible for administration is 
n0t at present responsible to the local legislature. It is impossible to 
assume that, as these factors change or disappear, the working of a 
system, which gives responsibility for policy to the centre and for 
administration to the provinces, will remain unaffected. It seems to