MEMORANDUM No. 4 is the first enquiry undertaken either
in Soviet Russia or abroad to estimate in full the balance of
payments of the U.S.S.R.

Among the problems discussed and facts of outstanding
importance revealed, are the following :

(1) Since the introduction of the Five Year Plan, Soviet Russia’s foreign indebtedness
has increased 2% times (p. 11).

(2) The Five Year Plan of exports and imports (pp. 6 and 15).
'8) The world depression adversely affected Soviet Russia’s exports, but her imports
cemained unaffected owing largely to the purchasing power of the U.S.S.R. being
artificially stimulated by foreign financial aid (pp. 10, 13, 14 and 15).

'4) The financing of the U.S.S.R. has become mainly the business of big finance backed
by foreign Government guarantees (p. 16 par. iii., pp. 20 and 21).
'5) Short term indebtedness has largely replaced the long term capital market (p. 15
par. i.).

'6) The total amount of credit extended by Great Britain to Soviet Russia amounts
to 30 million pounds. But there is a large indebtedness consisting of credits granted
by the City of London to Germany, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Latvia, Austria and
italy, and used by these Countries for their exports to the U.S.S.R. (p. 20).

'7) The Moratorium freed Germany's financial policy, thus allowing her to dispose of
those foreign monies already invested to finance Soviet orders (p. 14).

8) Although British investments are considerable they only facilitated to a very small
extent British exports to the US.S.R. (p. 21).

(9) World depression and the balance of payihents of the U.S.S.R. (p. 14).

10) Soviet debt in comparison to the long and short-term commercial debt of Pre-War
Russia (p. 15 par. i.).
'11) Changes in the composition of the short-term creditors of Russia (p. 16 par. ii.).
12) Elements of uncertainty and instability in the structure of the international
indebtedness of the U.S.S.R. (p. 16 par. iv.).