280 THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT [PART 11 
appearing that they in fact took place in the administration 
of martial law. 
In the case of Kimber v. Colonial Government,! which was 
a claim for the value of a horse which had been commandeered 
by a trooper under orders for use against the natives, the 
Court examined elaborately the question whether the act 
took place under martial law or not, and coming to the 
conclusion that it did, they held that they had no jurisdiction 
to interfere, but it may be noted that the Court was clearly of 
opinion that it had a full right to inquire into the circum- 
stances and to decide whether or not the case was one which 
fell within the category. 
In the case of Tilonko 2 the Court was invited to examine 
into the circumstances in which that native chief was being 
detained in the Central Jail at Pietermaritzburg. In that 
case it was alleged that about July 30, 1906, when Natal was 
not in a state of war, though martial law still existed, 
Tilonko was tried before a court-martial at Pietermaritzburg, 
found guilty of sedition and public violence, and since then 
had been detained in jail. The Commandant of Militia put 
in an affidavit which stated that his trial and detention were 
done under martial law and were not justiciable by the 
Court. This view was accepted by Beaumont J., who 
thought that during the existence of martial law the Court 
was not at liberty to inquire into the question whether at 
the time when the act complained of was committed there 
was existing such a state of war or rebellion as to justify 
the exercise of the arbitrary powers of martial law in a place 
admittedly within the areas covered by the Proclamation 
and after the outbreak of hostilities, though he appeared to 
think that the Court was entitled to satisfy itself, as had 
been done in the case of Kimber, that the act complained of 
was done by virtue of martial law and under the authority 
of those in whom the power of martial law was vested. On 
the other hand, Dove Wilson J., after quoting the affidavit, 
said that he was not satisfied that a mere statement that 
martial law was in existence, and that an act done under the 
* (1906) 26 N. L. R. 524. * (1906) 26 N. L. R. 567.