ON SLAVE TRADE (EAST COAST OF AFRICA). 
161 
tiou, was not less actively engaged against Syud Thoweynee through the medium of Syud 
Toorkee of Sohar, than was Syud Thoweynee, through his agent at Zanzibar, to weaken 
the authority of his brother Syud Majeed. 
36. I have deemed it pertinent to enter into the foregoing discussion of the mutual 
attitude and conduct of the two rival brothers as a precaution against any unfair bias 
towards either. That done, it is of some importance to inquire what would have been the 
probable result had the two parties come into actual collision on the occasion of Syud 
Thoweynee’s projected invasion of Zanzibar. 
37. As regards the chances of Syud Thoweynee, I have already written as follows :— 
‘‘ Colonel Rigby,* in his account of the preparation made by Syud Majeed to resist the 
expected invasion, represents the means at the disposal of the latter as ample to destroy 
any force brought against him, dwelling especially on the enthusiasm of the people in his 
cause. Subsequently, however, and long after the expedition of Syud Thoweynee had 
returned to Muscat, his re^^ort of the state of affairs at Zanzibar led the Government to 
conclude that the j)osition of Syud Majeed at Zanzibar was not secure :f and later still, on 
the occasion of the outbreak, when the El-Harth Arabs rose in support of Syud Barghash, 
all the force which Syud Majeed could bring against them was ineffectual, and the rising 
was not suppressed until assistance from three British men-of^war had been sent to co 
operate with them, when, as it is averred, the Arabs yielded because they would not fight 
against the British.”! Subsequent inquiry confirms me rather than otherwise in the 
obvious drift of the foregoing quotation. The elaborate account given by his Highness 
Syud Majeed § of the insurrection at Zanzibar in October 1859, divested of its vain colour 
ing, shows that he was hard pressed by the insurgents ; and Colonel Rigby, in attempting 
to reconcile a former statement of his, that the faction opposed to Majeed was utterly 
contemptible ” with the position which that faction had secured on the occasion referred 
to, renders it highly probable that, without the opportune assistance of the British, the 
struggle would have been prolonged, and the final result at least doubtful. || 
38. On the other hand, however, it is by no means certain that the success of the insur 
gents would have placed Zanzibar in the hands of Syud Thoweynee. Colonel Rigby is of 
opinion that the El-Harth were actuated by private aims, and availed theinselve^f Syud 
Thoweynee’s antagonism to Syud Majeed—not for his sake, but for their own, anxious, if 
possible, to get rid of the whole family of the late Imam.”^[ Besides which (and the 
reflection is of considerable importance in this inquiry), there is strong reason for believing 
that, had Syud Thoweynee persisted in the invasion of Zanzibar, the tribes in Oman would 
have thrown off their allegiance to him, and elected another sovereign in his stead. 
This contingency was foreseen by the late Lord Elphinstone, and recorded by him in aii 
-able Minute, dated 10th August 1859. His Lordship writes—“ When Colonel Russell 
was at Muscat, he heard it said openly that it was well for Syud Thoweynee that he had 
listened to the advice of this Government and returned to Muscat ; for if he had not done 
80, Syud Toorkee would undoubtedly have attacked Muscat in his absence, and would 
probably have succeeded in making himself master of it, and of all the Imam’s possessions 
in Oman. In grasping at the shadow of sovereignty in Zanzibar, Syud Thoweynee would 
have lost the substance in Muscat.” Considering that Muscat would have been almost 
denuded of ships and troops ; that the restless and mercenary tribes of Oman have never 
failed to seize any promising opportunity for bartering their influence and acquirino- 
gam; and that Syud Toorkee was on the spot quite prepared to avail himself of so favourable 
an ocaasion for promoting his own ambitious views—there is good ground for believino- 
that a civil war would have followed the continued absence of Syud Thoweynee and 
that the sovereignty of Oman would have been lost to him perhaps for ever Syud 
Majeed was doubtless fully aware of these weak points in the position of his antagonist, 
and was not backward to take advantage of them. His strategy could best be carried 
out through his brother at Sohar, who was accordingly subsidised by him to that end. 
Cnder the circumstances of tiie case, “it was quite natural,” so writes Lord Elphin 
stone, " that Syud Majeed should send arms and ammunition to Syud Toorkee with 
the view of Syud Toorkee’s creating a diversion in his favour at Muscat.”** 
39. To sum up Considering the fact that the people of Zanzibar and its Africa] 
dependencies did, on the death of the late Syud Saeed, elect his son Syud Majeed to be thei 
ruler in his stead ;tt considering that the altered condition of those dependencies durin< 
the last half century fully entitled them to that privilege ;$! considering that, if Syu! 
Ihow eynee, the elected sovereign of the parent state, was justified in coercing them int, 
submission, the people of the African dependencies, on the other hand, were equalb 
justified in resisting him ;§§ considering that it is very doubtful whether any such attemp 
on his part would have been successful ; |||| and considering the probability that, if persistec 
111 by feyud Thow^eynee, the projected invasion of Zanzibar would have led to the forfeitur. 
of his supremacy over Oman, # I arrive at the conclusion, on these grounds exclusively 
that Syud Majeed s claims to the sovereignty of Zanzibar and its African dependencie 
are superior to any which can be adduced in favour of Syud Thoweynee. 
40. But further, the argument on the score of expediency, involving the future pros 
perity of the Muscat as well as the Zanzibar state, preponderates unquestionably in favou’ 
of the foregoing conclusion. This is so forcibly pointed out by Colonel Rigby in reply U 
one of the queries submitted to him, that, to secure for his remarks the considáation wM^l 
^ thej 
Appendix, No. 8. 
* Letter No. 19 of 
1859. 
t Resolution of the 
Honourable Board, 
16th November 1859. 
Î Muscat Report, 
paragraph 24. 
§ Appendix L. 
II Appendix B, reply 
to Query 15. 
^ Appendix B, reply 
to Query 14. 
** Resolution of the 
Honourable Board, 
IGtliNoveinber 1859. 
ft Paragraplrs 25 
and 26. 
ÎÎ Paragraplis 28 
and 29. 
§§ Paragraph 80. 
il il Paragra¡)h 37. 
Paragraph 38,