APPENDIX  OP  CASES.

205

there  enumerated  all  relate  to  matters  of  a  comparatively
small  amount,  and  are  of  the  character  I  have  mentioned,
and  the  general  words  must  he  construed  by  reference  to
■the  particular  terms  which  precede  them,  and  must  be
taken  to  refer  to  matters  ejnsdem  generis  with  them.  But
we  have  had  presented  to  our  attention  the  case  of  Walker
v.  Giles,  6  C.  B.  662  (a),  followed  by  other  cases,  in  which
it  was  held  that  the  words  of  the  corresponding  section  of
the  earlier  Act  applied  to  mortgages  made  to  the  society  by
strangers,  and  were  not  confined  to  mortgages  by  their  own
members.  In  that  Act,  however,  the  words  “nor  other
security”  occurred  after  the  word  “bond,”  and  it  is  possible,
and  I  am  far  from  thinking  it  improbable,  that  those  words
were  omitted  by  the  legislature  in  consequence  of  the
decision  in  that  case.  What  the  legislature  meant  was  to
exempt  transactions  relating  to  small  sums,  and  to  official
■acts  and  the  conduct  of  internal  business  ;  they  therefore
left  out  the  words  “  nor  other  security  ”  for  the  purpose  of
confining  the  exemption  to  bonds,  and  to  such  bonds  as  are
required  in  the  administration  of  the  society’s  affairs.  If
the  transfer  of  a  mortgage  to  the  society  is  exempt,  it  is
impossible  to  exclude  from  the  exemption  the  case  of  an
original  mortgage  to  them,  where  by  universal  usage  the
duty  with  other  cost  of  conveyance  is  to  be  paid  not  by
them  but  by  the  mortgagor.  It  is  impossible  without
clear  words  to  suppose  that  the  legislature  can  have  done
anything  so  mischievous  or  so  contrary  to  equity  as  to
extend  exceptional  privileges,  not  only  to  the  society,  but
to  all  those  that  deal  with  it.
We  must  therefore  either  read  the  words  as  applicable
only  to  cases  where  by  usage  or  under  the  contract  the
society  would  have  to  pay  the  duty,  for  which,  however,
there  is  no  authority,  no  such  limitation  being  expressed
in  the  Act,  or  we  must  read  the  section  as  referring  to
acts,  such  as  a  power  of  attorney,  which  bring  into  existence ­
  or  create  the  possibility  of  negotiation,  acts  which
are  in  a  manner  exclusively  the  acts  of  the  society,  or
of  its  officers  and  members  in  their  relation  to  it  and  to  one
another.
Martin,  B.—I  am  of  the  same  opinion.  It  is  obvious
both  from  13  Geo.  4,  c.  56,  and  18  &  19  Viet.  c.  63,  that  the
object  of  the  legislature  was  to  relieve  these  societies  and

(«)  This  case  related  to  a  Benefit  Building  Society  under
6  &  7  Will.  4,  c.  32.