O-

Bel

o  n  Weilwi'rtsshaft  r\  c  r.  Q
o  U  Kiel  ^  3-  0

INTRODUCTION
This  essay  traces  back  to  a  running  comment
upon  the  actual  course  of  our  war  financing  made
day  after  day  to  the  bare  handful  of  students  into
which  the  Economic  Seminary  of  the  Johns  Hopkins ­
  University  had  in  the  early  months  of  the
nation’s  entry  into  the  great  struggle  swiftly  resolved ­
  itself.  Any  worth  that  the  study  may
possess  is  thus,  in  the  first  instance,  to  be  shared
with  this  little  group  since,  to  a  man,  drawn  into
the  country’s  service.
It  is  never  easy  to  write  critically  of  current  fiscal
practices,  least  of  all  when  the  nation’s  existence
hangs  in  the  balance.  Many  facts  are  uncollected,
much  material  may  not  be  made  accessible,  and
from  first  to  last  the  writer  is  held  and  tied  by  his
wish  to  help  and  not  hurt.  Yet  if  his  inquiry  is  to
serve  any  present  use,  the  student  cannot  wait  until
present  policies  have  become  historic  records.
With  the  certainty  of  some  incompleteness,  at  the
risk  of  unfortunate  oversight  or  avoidable  error,
he  will  offer  that  which  he  has  rather  than  await  the
comfortable  detail  of  the  full  event.
This  is  the  mood  in  which  the  present  study  is
sent  forth.  Sound  and  admirable  in  the  main,  our
war  borrowing  has  been  marred  here  and  there
by  serious  error,  injuring  us  now  and  certain  if