50 The Stock Market Crash—dAnd After 
deserved from the speculative public.” This, he 
says, resulted in the New York City banks with- 
drawing their support of the growing account of 
brokers’ loans from October, 1927, to October, 
1929, which in turn resulted in the market depend- 
ing more and more upon the irresponsible loans “for 
others,” these “others” meaning business concerns 
having large loanable funds. This constituted an 
element of instability. On this subject a correspond- 
ent comments anonymously as follows: 
“I feel that the money market aspects of the 
panic, as far as they arose from the large amount 
of loans by other lenders, cannot be dissociated 
from the previous open market policy of the Federal 
Reserve System, which, through establishing artifi- 
cially tight money conditions, raised the rate on call 
loans and attracted other lenders’ funds into them.” 
Overextension of Loans 
Another bankers’ view is represented by M. H. 
Cahill, President of the Plaza Trust Company of 
New York, and formerly President of the New York 
State Bankers’ Association. Mr. Cahill says in the 
Manufacturers’ Record of Baltimore (issue of 
November, 1929): “Every banker in the country 
had, for several months previous to the break in 
the market, been demanding from 40 per cent to 
100 per cent margins on collateral loans. This fact 
in itself was conclusive evidence that the banker 
knew that the stocks he was accepting as security 
for loans were priced at fictitious levels. Under