THE MONETARY CRISIS 57
to the Swiss franc fixed on Berlin differed considerably,
however, from those which prevailed on the free market
at Amsterdam or Geneva, where bills on Germany drawn
in marks were paid for in florins and Swiss francs respec-
tively, and, in view of the monopoly of the Foreign
Exchange Office, arbitraging could not come into play in
order to bring the rates to level time. With the object,
therefore, of creating a single rate for the mark at the
level desired by the Office, German exporters were urged
not to allow their foreign clients to discharge debts by
purchasing and transmitting bills on Germany drawn in
marks, but rather themselves to draw bills on their
clients in foreign currencies, which would be negotiated
at Berlin. This method was all the more justifiable in
that neutral exporters usually required German importers
to settle in neutral currencies and rarely negotiated bills
drawn in marks.
The creation of the Foreign Exchange Office had in
any case the advantage of giving German importers, who
had contracted to pay in foreign currencies, the means of
obtaining these currencies at a comparatively stable rate,
leaving the exchange risks on the neutral market to be
borne by foreign dealers who covered the bills drawn in
marks. The Office may further be considered to have
contributed to supporting the rate, even abroad, since the
mark will be seen to have remained fairly stable on foreign
markets after the Office was created and up to about the
end of 1916. But the centralisation of foreign payments
could no longer send up or even maintain the rate of exchange
when the available funds thus collected ceased to be sufficient
for requirements.
§ 4. Aggravation of the Exchange Crisis after the War.
Contrary to the hopes which were formed at the
Armistice, when all the exchanges including the mark,
the Austrian crown and the rouble had improved, the
cessation of hostilities was not to put an end to the ex-
change crisis. It is true that the dollar was soon back at
