THE MONETARY CRISIS 31
mark is no doubt partly to be explained by a lack of
initiative or power in the Banking Office, and by the
economic and technical conditions as a whole. When
the proceeds of the small American loan were exhausted
in 1919, the United States, alarmed by the social policy of
Czechoslovakia, which they believed to have fallen under
the influence of the Bolshevists, stopped all credits. The
Germans thereupon undertook to support the Czech
exchange either by opening mark credits or by accepting
payments in Czech crowns.
In the event, Czechoslovakia succeeded, not only in
paying for its purchases in Germany in marks, but also
in accepting marks in payment for its deliveries in
Germany. Thus on all sides the connection between the
two exchanges was confirmed.! On the whole, dealings
in Czech crowns were confined to Vienna, Prague and
Berlin, and the Prague exchange could never obtain an
ascendancy over its rivals at short notice. In particular,
the Vienna exchange, which was better equipped, con-
tinued to be the chief foreign exchange market in Central
Europe ; for Western dealers continued to settle chiefly
through Vienna or Berlin, and even the Zurich exchange
felt this influence.
This interdependence, however, of the rate of the Czech
crown on the one hand and the rates of the mark and the
Austrian crown on the other, lasting as it did for two years, the
issue of the former being strictly limited 2 and the latter being
subject to continual i»flation, none the less contradicts the theory
on which Rasin based his plan and which is still held by so
many economists. Moreover, in spite of currency contraction,
domestic prices in Czechoslovakia rose steadily. The rise,
which was at first moderated in the case of certain com.-
modities in 1919 by a conjunction of favourable circum-
!8ee A. Rasin, 0p. cit., p. 73. The author also shows that the Czech
importers preferred paying for German imports in marks because they
feared a disagio on the crown, and explains, on the other hand, why the
Czech exporters desired the Czech crown to fall with the mark in order to
have the benefit of a continually increasing premium on the exchange.
® It may be added that, in spite of a social programme involving a con-
siderable burden, the 1921 Budget was almost balanced. (Piot, p. 189.)
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