SEMAINE D'ÉTUDE SUR LE ROLE DE L ANALYSE ECONOMETRIQUE ETC. 1173 
of consumption requirements or demand when account is taken 
of the quantities of other foods available. This probably ex- 
plains why there was a substantial diversion of resources from 
producing sugar beets for refining to sugar beets for feed. The 
large imports of sugar from Cuba have probably had a signifi- 
cant influence on the decision to reduce the refining of sugar 
beets. 
In 1961 the Soviet Union imported 3.34 million tons of 
sugar (refined basis). Total granulated sugar production in 
1962 was 7.8 million tons, of which 6.0 million tons was from 
sugar beets. Total sugar refining in 1962 was 7% below 1961. 
The decline in refined sugar from 1961 to 1962 is consistent 
with the view that the 1965 sugar goal was set at too high a 
level relative to other farm products. 
One of the factors responsible for the modest increase in 
Soviet agricultural output since 1958 has been the failure of 
industry to deliver the inputs for agriculture that were implied 
in the plan. In March, 1962 Krushchev remarked as fol- 
lows (1): 
The seven-year plan called for increasing the output of 
mineral fertilizers from 12,000,000 to 35,000,000 tons, an in- 
crease of 23,000,000 tons. Three years have passed, and the 
production of fertilizers has increased by only 2,900,000 tons. 
In the first three years of the seven-year period the plan for 
new capacity fulfilled only 44%. The same thing is happening 
with the organization of herbicide production. Two years ago 
the Central Committee and the government adopted a decision 
on this question. Time is passing but there are no herbicides. » 
The 1962 fertilizer output was 17.3 million tons or 13% 
greater than in 1961. Fertilizer output in 1958 was 12.4 mil- 
lion tons, instead of the 12 million tons implied by the above 
quotation. Thus in four years the increase in output was only 
4.9 million tons. 
( 
Pravda », March 6, 1062 
Johnson - pag.