18 COMMITTEE REPORT
Salaries of Board salaries are now palpably inadequate and incommen-
surate with those which necessarily must be paid to both the reserve
agents and the governors of the district banks. Some of the latter
receive three and four times as much as members of the Federal
Reserve Board. Their compensation must approach, at least, the
salaries paid in the field of general banking, from which federal
reserve management must be drawn. This Committee recommends
that salaries be increased from the present figure of $12,000 to a
minimum of $30,000 per annum for the Governor of the Board and
$25,000 for the other members. Objection to these salary increases
should not be made on account of conditions existing in the general
governmental service. It is to be noted that salaries as well as other
expenses of the Board are defrayed, as would be the cost of a sepa-
rate building, from assessments upon the reserve banks and not upon
the United States Treasury.
Recommendation
Recommendation
Recommendation
Recommendation
The Committee recommends that provision be made to increase
the attractiveness of Board membership and develod the influence
ind independence of the Board by:
(a) Enhancing the importance of the position of Governor of
the Board by making him Chairman.
(b) Housing the Board in a building of its own.
(¢) Increasing the salaries of the Governor and members of the
Federal Reserve Board to compare more favorably with the salaries
paid the principal administrative officers of the reserve banks.
Thoroughgoing consideration should be given to the relations of
the Treasury to the Federal Reserve Board, especially with respect
to discontinuing the membership of the Secretary on the Board, as
well as to the desirability of a change in the status of the office of the
Comptroller of the Currency to bring that office more directly under
the purview of the Board.
This Committee has insisted that the efficiency of the reserve
system must depend upon wise administration. On this account, it
has opposed the employment of legislative devices to restrict nar-
rowly the powers of the reserve banks.
Public Relations
The grant of liberal powers to the reserve banks necessarily re-
quires that there be complete recognition by them of their public re-
sponsibilities. Neither the public in general, nor Congress, will be
content to rely solely upon the probability that the administration
will always be composed of far-sighted men. The activities of the
reserve banks must be such as to insure confidence in the system’s
general policies. Such confidence cannot be gained unless the proper
type of criticism is stimulated.
(Continued on paae 50)