Metadata: Agricultural relief (Pt. 4)

AGRICULTURAL RELIEF 
205 
Mr. KiLgore. If you buy it sufficiently low down—— 
Mr. Fort. I said, bought at production cost. 
Mr. Kirogre. If you buy it sufficiently low down—I do not know. 
[ will not commit myself. 
Mr Fort. I would like to have somebody put such figures in the 
record. I have studied it and I can not find it. 
I had a great wheat miller tell me I was wrong in this theory, and to 
prove it he told me how long it took a great pool of wheat millers to 
work out whole on a similar operation, engaged in to prevent the 
market from breaking wide open in a period of depression. But he 
admitted they got out whole in seven years. That is the only 
proof I have ever had offered me as to the unsoundness of this bill. 
Mr. KirGore. I think there is a lot of experience that this board 
has got to get in operating under any surplus-control measure to 
answer Just the question that you raised, or just how high up or how 
near the cost of production the board can afford to enter the market 
and buy and stabilize, and yet not run too much risk of sustaining 
osses. 
But whatever that may be or whatever they may determine in the 
course of operation, they can take greater risks in stabilizing nearer 
the cost of production under the equalization fee bill than they can 
under simple loans. 
Now, you have in a nutshell my thought as to the necessity of the 
equalization fee. 
Mr. Fort. In other words, the only real difference between us on 
the economic side of it is that you feel that the equalization fee 
would give added psychological strength to your holding corporation? 
Mr. KiLGORE. Yes, sir; psychological and financial strength. 
Mr. Fort. And it seems to me that in contradistinction to your 
psychological proposal that anything which has the Treasury of the 
United States back of it is going to have sufficient psychological 
strength to induce the trade to believe that the commodity is not 
going to be dumped on the market. 
Mr. KiLcore. We had the prestige of the United States Govern- 
ment behind the finance corporations that were set up in 1926 in the 
several cotton States to loan money to get cotton, and they did not 
handle any cotton. R 
Mr. Fort. They did not offer to loan a hundred per cent of the 
value of the cotton. 
Mr. FuLmer. Is there anything in the Crisp bill about, loaning a 
hundred per cent on cotton? . 
Mr. Forr. It offers to ‘advance the working capital of the corpora- 
tion and permits it—gives it the whole margin, loans it all the funds 
to operate. And one other thing, Doctor, on that point: You will 
concede, will you not, that the two boards—let us suppose that a 
bill was passed containing the Crisp features and also containing an 
alternative provision to the same board, if it saw fit, to put the equali- 
zation fee in effect. In other respects the bills are identical in lan- 
guage, and there would be no distinction in your mind between the 
point at which the board in one case would authorize purchases and 
the price at which it would authorize purchases in the other, would 
there —the same group of individuals setting the price at which it 
would authorize purchase?
	        
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