346 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
which they are unwilling to work, and the parties would thus enter 
into the arbitration on an unequal footing. Further, it seems to us that 
if an award is to command sufficient confidence to justify its enforce- 
ment, it must rest, like a judicial finding, on the application of criteria 
which are accepted beforehand by the public. In other words, the prin- 
ciples which are to guide the tribunal’s decision must be formulated in 
legislation. Even in respect of wages, we doubt if any satisfactory crite- 
rion for an equitable, as distinct from a minimum, wage is available ; and 
this is only one of the questions that can come before a tribunal. 
Public Utility Services. 
The public utility services stand in a different category. Section 
15 of the Act embodies the principle that those responsible for the mainte- 
nance of the services essential to the safety, health and welfare of the 
community shall not discontinue work without notice. The principle is 
accepted in a number of other countries and had found a place in certain 
other Indian Acts long before the Trade Disputes Bill was introduced ; 
but it is not one which commands by any means universal assent. In our 
view the weakest point of the Indian provision is that, while it restricts 
the powers of workers in public utility services to coerce their employers, 
it gives in return no assurance that their grievances will receive a hearing. 
We have made elsewhere proposals to alter the position of railway work- 
ers in this respect. With regard to the other classes to whom the section 
applies, we think the question of providing means for the impartial 
examination of disputes should have early consideration. The danger that 
must be faced here is that the external machinery set up for arbitration 
may be invoked without adequate cause, e.g., that strike notices may be 
sent whenever a workman is dismissed, and that there may be a corres- 
ponding disinclination to settle disputes internally. This danger can be 
minimised in various ways, e.g., by making arbitration conditional on a 
definite failure of the parties to reach agreement in a reasonable time and 
on a substantial measure of support for an application, and by requiring 
a deposit of money with each application. The deposit required, which 
could be forfeited if the application proved to be trivial or vexatious, 
should not be larger than is necessary for the purpose in view. 
Permanent Courts. 
A further question which deserves attention is that of the 
establishment of permanent courts in place of the ad hoc tribunals for 
which the Act provides. A permanent tribunal would have two advant- 
ages. In the first place, its existence would eliminate the delay inevitable 
in constituting tribunals under the present scheme. By experience 
it would acquire intimacy with industrial questions and facility in 
dealing with them. On the other hand, it is important that the members 
of a tribunal should command the confidence of the parties, and there 
are frequently persons who, though eminently qualified to assist in settling 
one dispute, might be of little service in connection with another. Nor 
would it be easy to find non-officials who are prepared to serve on any 
tribunal when called. A possible alternative to a permanent court