INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES. 
247 
in the leading industrial provinces would be the appointment of a perma- 
nent official chairman with whom different members could be associat- 
ed in different cases, but there is nothing in the present Act to pre- 
vent a local Government from re-appointing the same chairmanin each 
dispute. 
Amendment of the Trade Disputes Act. 
In respect of one section, we recommend an immediate amend- 
ment of the present Act. Section 13 is designed to prevent the disclosure 
by members of Courts or Boards of confidential information relating to 
trade unions or individual businesses. The main part of the section fol- 
lows generally the British Act, but to this are appended provisions render- 
ing any member of a Court or Board liable to prosecution at the instance 
of the person aggrieved by a wrongful disclosure. The members do not 
receive the protection against criminal prosecution ordinarily granted 
bo public servants in respect of acts done in the execution of their duties, 
nor is it necessary for the prosecution to show that the disclosure was 
wilful or to prove that any injury has been done. Moreover no protection 
appears to be granted against a civil suit. We are inclined to doubt if a 
criminal prosecution is at all appropriate, at any rate in connection with a 
disclosure in an official report. It would perhaps be sufficient in a 
temporary Act of this kind to provide that no prosecution or suit should 
be maintainable on account of any breach of the section or any damage 
caused thereby, except with the previous sanction of the (Government 
which appointed the tribunal. 
Neglect of Conciliation. 
In concluding this chapter, we would emphasise the fact that 
the most useful form of State assistance in dealing with trade disputes 
is scarcely employed in India. The official outlook, like that of the public, 
has been concentrated largely on the final stages of disputes. As a rule 
committees and tribunals have been set up only when disputes had 
attained considerable magnitude, and when a strike was either imminent 
or in being. Individual officers, on the comparatively rare occasions 
when they have intervened, have also waited, as a rule, till the later 
stages. It is at the climax of a dispute, when the parties have com- 
pletely failed to reach a common standpoint, that settlement is most 
difficult. At this stage public opinion tends to demand action. Govern- 
ment, which has been either unaware or a passive spectator of the earlier 
stages, may be compelled to intervene, and such intervention nearly 
alwavs partakes more of the nature of arbitration than conciliation. 
Conciliation Officers. 
It is in the earlier stages that assistance of the right kind can be 
most valuable. We do not suggest that the heavy artillery of the Trade 
Disputes Act should be used at this stage ; we would repeat that it is 
far better to get the parties to a dispute to settle it themselves than to 
put forward a settlement for them and attempt, by invoking public 
Dbinion or otherwise, to give it force. There are frequent occasions