880 THE FEDERATIONS AND THE UNION [PART IV
the jurisdiction of the several Courts of the states, except as
provided in this section.
(2) The several Courts of the states shall within the limits
of their several jurisdictions, whether such limits are as to
locality, subject-matter, or otherwise, be invested with
federal jurisdiction, in all matters in which the High Court
has original jurisdiction or in which original jurisdiction can
be conferred upon it, except as provided in the last preceding
section, and subject to the following conditions and restric-
sions :—
(a) Every decision of the Supreme Court of a state, or any
other court of a state from which at the establishment of the
Commonwealth an appeal lay to the Queen in Council, shail
be final and conclusive except so far as an appeal may be
hrought to the High Court.
(b) Wherever an appeal lies from a decision of any Court
or Judge of a state to the Supreme Court of the state, an
appeal from the decision may be brought to the High Court.
(c) The High Court may grant special leave to appeal to
the High Court from any decision of any Court or Judge
of a state notwithstanding that the law of the state may
prohibit any appeal from such Court or Judge.
(d) The federal jurisdiction of a Court of summary juris-
diction of a state shall not be judicially exercised except by
a Stipendiary or Police or Special Magistrate, or some
Magistrate of the state who is specially authorized by the
Governor-General to exercise such jurisdiction.
Several questions have been raised as to the effect of these
provisions. In the first place, it was decided by the High
Court in the case of Parkin v. James! that the provisions in
3.73 (ii) cannot be interpreted to refer only to appeals from the
full Courts of the states; from these Courts, as a rule, it is
that appeals lie to the Queen in Council by right, but the High
Court decided that they could entertain any appeal from
any Court which was in effect the Supreme Court, whether it
was exercising its jurisdiction through one or more judges.
This decision, which is no doubt sound in law, was very incon-
venient, for it leaves it open to every suitor to go straight
from one judge to the High Court, whereas the intention of
she framers of the Act was no doubt not to bring about this
© 2.0. L. R. 315, foreshadowed by Quick and Garran, op. cit., p. 742, and
secepted by the Privy Council in Blake v. Bayne, [19081 A. C. 371.