THE MONETARY CRISIS 
§ 3. Exchange policy in Germany and Austria during the 
War ; the Exchange Control Offices (Centrales de 
Dewises). 
In the case of Germany and her Allies, the exchange 
crisis, beginning with the disappearance of the export 
gold point, declared itself earlier, i.e., at the outbreak of 
the war, and took a more serious form. By the end of 
1914 the mark was losing 109%, and the Austrian crown 
169, on Geneva, while francs and sterling stood slightly 
above par. After remaining fairly stable for some months 
with a loss of 129, the mark fell from November 1915 
onwards until it had lost 209%, early in 1916. After a 
respite it lost 349, by the end of that year, and 509, by 
the middle of 1917. Finally, after a sharp recovery at the 
time of the Russian armistice, the loss stood only at 30%, 
then once more reached 46%, and was back at 409%, on the 
day of the general armistice. The Austrian crown described 
a nearly parallel curve 15 points lower. 
On the whole, except for a sharp recovery in the mark 
and in the Austrian crown at the cessation of hostilities 
with Russia, the exchanges of the Central Powers had 
suffered almost continuous depreciation from the out- 
break of war until the armistice with the Western Allies, 
when they recovered for a short time. But from 1915 in 
the case of France and Italy, and from 1917 in the case 
of the Allies as a whole, the depreciation was nearly as 
continuous. The essential difference between the two 
curves of exchange rates—that of the Central Powers and 
that of the Western Allies—lies in the fact that the 
former shows on the whole a much greater depreciation. 
After 1916 the mark lost about 109, more than the 
French franc, and nearly 309, in 1917. It is true that 
this difference was much reduced as a result of the rise 
in marks at the beginning of 1918, and never exceeded 
159, during that year. 
The difference in average depreciation during the 
period of hostilities is explained by the difficulty Germany 
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