Remedies and Preventives of Panic 239
ber, 1929, by two billion dollars. This withdrawal
of funds from the call-loan market was by foreign
lenders, investment and trading companies, and other
corporations and individuals. In addition, loans to
brokers for out-of-town banks including loans for
account of their customers, diminished by $800,000,-000.
 In these circumstances, the New York City
banks came to the rescue, increasing loans for their
own account by $1,000,000,000; also, they increased
their security and other loans to customers, and their
investments. The weekly reporting member banks
in leading cities increased their total loans and investments
 in this way from October 2d to October 30th,
by $1,600,000,000. Most of this increase was in
New York City banks, whose net demand deposits
rose by $1,500,000,000 from October 23rd to October
 3oth. With this increase their reserve requirements
 grew, adding to their reserve balances with
the Federal Reserve Bank by $240,000,000. During
 this crowded week the Reserve Bank of New
York added $150,000,000 to its discounts from member
 banks; and let loose a fresh stream of credits by
purchasing $150,000,000 worth of United States
Government securities in the open market.
By such measures money rates eased during the
height of the panic. Call-money rates had prevailed
at eight to nine per cent during September, but fell
to six per cent in the latter part of October, and,
through the panic and subsequent liquidation, ranged
at and below six per cent to 414 per cent. On October
 31st, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York