276 SECRETARIAL PRACTICE 
Application 
of Local 
Laws. 
Alternative 
Interpre- 
tations. 
Attorney’s 
Signature. 
unaware of the usages of a market, engages a broker on that 
market, he authorises that broker to contract on the footing 
of such usages as are reasonable and do not alter the nature 
of the contract [Perry v. Barnett (1885), 15 Q.B.D. 388]. 
The general rule of law is that the authority of the agent, in 
the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, is to be 
determined according to the law of the country where the 
agency was created. But the Court will do its best to as- 
certain the intention of the grantor; for a power of attorney 
as was stated by Lord Lindley in Chatenay v. Brazilian 
Telegraph Company (1891), 1 Q.B. 79, is ‘a one-sided instru- 
ment, an instrument which expresses the meaning of the 
person who makes it, but is not in any sense a contract.’ 
The judgments in this case show that if a power of attorney 
is granted abroad, and even though it is written in a foreign 
language and drafted in a foreign form, then, when once 
it is ascertained from the evidence of competent translators 
and experts that it is the intention of the grantor that it 
should be acted upon in England, the extent of the authority, 
so far as transactions in England are concerned, must be 
determined by English law. 
Where a power admits of two different interpretations, 
the attorney is within his right to adopt consistently the 
interpretation which to him seems best; “if a principal gives 
anorder to an agent in such uncertain terms as to besusceptible 
of two different meanings, and the agent bona fide adopts one 
of them and acts upon it, it is not competent for the principal 
to repudiate the act as unauthorized because he meant the 
order to be read in the other sense of which it is equally 
capable’ [Ireland v. Livingstone (1872), 5 H.L. 395, at p. 416]. 
Where, however, there is a choice between a definite and an 
indefinite construction of the instrument, the attorney is 
bound to act upon the definite construction [Bertram Vv. 
Godfray (1830), T Knapp, 381]. 
The Law of Property Act 1925, s. 123, declares that ‘the 
donee of a power of attorney may, if he thinks fit, execute 
or do any assurance, instrument, or thing in and with his 
own name and signature and under his own seal, where 
sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the 
power; and every assurance, instrument or thing so executed 
and done shall be as effectual in law, to all intents, as if 
it had been executed or done by the donee of the power in 
the name and with the signature and seal of the donor thereof.’ 
The words ‘by the authority of the donor of the power’ 
have led to the contention that the section can only apply 
to an instrument in which the principal has expressly stated