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APPENDIX OF CASES. 
Act was in force, but after the passing of the Industrial 
and Provident Societies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Viet. c. 87), it 
obtained a certificate of registration under it. The debt 
sought to be recovered was incurred before the passing of 
the last-mentioned Act, but the action was commenced 
after. The case was tried before Martin, B., at West 
minster, and a verdict was found for the plaintiff, leave 
being reserved to the defendants to move to enter a nonsuit 
if the court should be of opinion that they were not liable 
in their corporate capacity. 
Macnamam in this term moved to enter a nonsuit accord 
ingly. 
Gates now showed cause. 
Martin, B.—We are all of opinion that this rule must 
be made absolute. The case is governed by that of Dean v. 
Millard. In that case the action was brought against the 
individual members, and the court held that it was well 
brought, on the ground that though for the sake of con 
venience, before the late statute, the names of public officers 
were to be used in actions against the society, yet the real 
cause of action was against the individual members, and 
they were ultimately liable. Williams, J., there says:— 
“ That argument” (referring to the argument for the defend 
ants) “ would have been admissible if the legislature, instead 
of saying, as they have done in sect. 6, that the certificate 
of registration shall vest in the society all the property 
that may at the time be vested in any person in trust for 
the society, and all legal proceedings then pending by or 
against any such trustee or other officer on account of the 
society may be prosecuted by or against the society in its 
registered name without abatement, had gone on to say 
that all claims and rights of action existing at the time of 
the passing of the Act might be so prosecuted. But they 
have not said so; they have confined the indulgence to 
actions pending at the time of the obtaining of the certi 
ficate of registration. That must mean actions commenced 
before the passing of 25 & 26 Viet. c. 87, because none 
could be commenced after against any but existing 
members.” I was much struck by Mr. Gates’s argument 
on the construction of the 6th section, but we cannot adopt 
Iris construction in opposition to the Court of Common 
Pleas. 
Bramwell, B.—I was much struck with Mr. Gates’s 
^argument on the 6th section that it could not be meant to