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APPENDIX OF CASES. 
These decisions have been followed in the recent cases of 
Callaghan v. Dolioin, L. B. 4 0. P. 288, and Thompson v. 
Planet Building Society, L. R. 15 Eq. 333. 
The words “ every dispute ” must he read as referring 
only to disputes between the society and the members as 
members, and not in any other capacity they may be placed 
in, by having the funds of the society advanced to them 
by way of mortgage, or on loan on the security of their 
policies. In Morrison v. Glover, 19 L. J. (Excli.) 20, the 
defendant, a member of a building society, having mort 
gaged some leasehold premises to the society, and thereby 
covenanted to observe the rules, and also to pay certain 
rents due to the superior landlord, was sued for breaches of 
both these covenants; but contended by his plea that the 
cause of action ought to have been referred to arbitration 
pursuant to the rules. The court, in delivering judgment, 
said :—“ The only point that remained for our consideration 
was, whether this was a matter in dispute between the 
society and one of its members, according to the true 
meaning of the rules established by the society, so as to be 
the subject-matter of arbitration, or whether it might be 
made the subject of an action. It was contended on the 
part of the defendant, that whatever question arose between 
the society and its members must be referred to arbitration. 
They way in which it became material was this : Some of 
the grounds of the action were undoubtedly between the 
society and the defendant in the character of a member, 
and there may be strong reasons for saying that, if the 
claim had been entirely confined to a right on the part of 
the plaintiff of that description, then the case which was 
referred to of Crisp v. Bunbury, ■would apply, and the plea 
would be good ; therefore the demurrer ought not to be 
allowed, and the defendant would be entitled to judgment. 
But it is clear that some of the breaches relied upon by 
the plaintiffs, for instance, a covenant to pay rent to Lord 
Cadogan, were matters not between the defendant as a 
member of the society and the society ; they were merely 
between the defendant and the society as a mortgagor. 
Now, we are of opinion that if any other rule be established 
than that the dispute must be with the party as member— 
if we go beyond that one step—the consequence would be, 
that any extraneous matter of any sort that might happen to 
arise between the society and any of its members, having 
no connection with the society, would become the subject- 
matter of reference. It appears to us, therefore, the words 
‘matter in dispute’ must be read ‘matter in difference